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SO: This is Sue Onslow interviewing Dr Peter Slinn at Senate House on 
Tuesday 5th February 2013. Peter, thank you very much indeed for 
coming to Senate House to talk today. I wonder if you could begin, by 
saying please, how did you get interested and involved in the 
Commonwealth and Commonwealth activities, in the first place? 
 
PS: It’s rather curious because most people who have an interest in Africa often 
had some kind of family connection. I had none of that. I was brought up in 
the English Midlands and went to the local university in Oxford as it were, but 
when I was choosing special subjects, we had a little bit of freedom in the 
third year. There was one on constitutional documents of the modern 
Commonwealth and what appealed to me about it was it actually went up to 
1953. As this was 1962, most Oxford history courses stopped at 1914! 
 
SO: Because that’s when history comes to ‘a full stop’! 
 
PS: I was intrigued and I was very fortunate that my tutor was a very distinguished 
Commonwealth scholar, David Fieldhouse, who was then teaching at Queen 
Elizabeth House. So this gave me a chance not only to read all the classic 
Commonwealth texts such as Berriedale Keith, getting right back to the 
Durham Report and the evolution of responsible government; but it also 
involved looking at some legal cases. The cases which were then very much 
in people’s minds in the Commonwealth were the vote cases in South Africa 
whereby the National Party government which had come to power in 1948 
eventually, during the course of a tortured litigation during the 1950s, 
managed to get all non-whites off the voters rolls with some opposition from 
the judiciary; but subsequently the judiciary was effectively packed in favour 
of the government. 
 
So, I got interested in these legal cases so as a result of that I decided that I 
would enter solicitor’s articles which I did in 1963. It so happened that my 
principal in this very small firm in the West End was a gentleman called 
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James Lemkin, who was one of the founding members of Bow Group of 
Liberal Conservatives of the Iain MacLeod persuasion, and also I think of 
Capricorn Africa. And again I think it was purely chance in Lemkin’s case - he 
came from Manchester Jewish business stock but he’d done part of his 
National Service in the Navy at Simonstown [laughs] so I think his interest in 
Africa was as adventitious as mine! 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
PS: And he was instructed by the then Northern Rhodesian government in the 
great dispute they were having with the British South Africa Company over 
the ownership of the royalties to the mines, the great copper mines of the 
Northern Rhodesian Copper Belt. So, as an articled clerk, instead of 
conveyancing houses in Harrow, I found myself exploring treaties between 
the agents of the British South Africa Company and the local chiefs in the 
area of the Copper Belt. 
 
SO: So, this was investigating the ‘nuts and bolts’ of empire? 
 
PS: Indeed so, yes. And also one of the interesting aspects is that we were 
fighting what I suppose we would now call a PR campaign in order to 
convince investors and the City that the Northern Rhodesian government was 
not a gang of communists, but had a legitimate case that the British South 
Africa Company did not actually own the rights; so one of our great 
achievements, I remember, was a big headline in the Financial Times saying, 
“Doubts Cast on Company’s Title”. 
 
SO: Was this just at the time when Northern Rhodesia was starting to 
negotiate its exit from the Central African Federation? 
 
PS: Well, it’s a bit later than that. The Central African Federation had had it by the 
end of ’63 so what we’re talking about is the run up to independence of what 
became Zambia, on the 24th October 1964. I wasn’t directly involved in the 
negotiations but if you read the accounts at the time you’ll discover there was 
a famous meeting between the government and the company’s 
representatives in a tent a few hours before independence, and eventually a 
settlement was reached. 
 
SO: What you’re describing then is the Commonwealth that you knew and 
came to love at Oxford under Professor David Fieldhouse, the ‘Nehru 
Commonwealth’, the Commonwealth of 1949, including India as a 
republic. 
 
PS: That’s right, yes. 
 
SO: But the Commonwealth by the early 1960s was already becoming a very 
different entity with decolonisation and the admission of newly 
independent African states. 
 
PS: Yes, that’s right. It was of course a tremendous rush from Ghana in 1957 and 
most of the rest of East and West Africa following by 1964. By 1964 Zambia 
was almost a little bit behind, leaving only Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. 
By the end of the ‘60s, the old empire in Africa had disappeared except of 
course for the problem of Rhodesia! [Laughs] 
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SO: Please could we talk a little more about the problem of Rhodesia 
because I know that your professional background is very much one of 
being involved in advising the Foreign Office on Rhodesia. 
 
PS: Well exactly. So, with this interest in Africa, instead of entering what you 
might call the respectable branch of the legal profession I saw this 
advertisement for an assistant legal adviser in the Diplomatic Service and 
they were recruiting for the then Commonwealth Office. I’m not sure exactly 
about the dates but the Colonial Office was merged with the Commonwealth 
Relations Office I think in ’66, and of course the Commonwealth Office was 
merged with the Foreign Office in ’68 to form the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. So, I took up my post in May 1967 in the Commonwealth Office. It’s 
disgraceful actually, this is really just purely an anecdote, but you know how 
well people prepare for interviews these days,? Well, I thought I know about 
the Commonwealth, so the legal adviser said, “But what about international 
law? We also have to advise departments on matters of international law. Do 
you know any international law?” I said, “Well no, not really, I’ve never studied 
international law but I understand that all you have to do is look it all up in a 
book by some foreign sounding chap called Schwartzenberger”! 
 
SO: You didn’t! 
 
PS: I did! And I thought, “Well, that’s done that!” But surprisingly I think they 
obviously thought I really did know. I suppose probably I was the only 
candidate who really knew much about the Commonwealth so they thought, 
“Well, he can pick up the foreign international law” [laughs]. 
 
SO: It’s deeply humbling when you think of how rigorously students are now 
interviewed. 
 
PS: Exactly so. Well, that was it, yes. Perhaps in those days I think they probably 
thought, “Well, the chap’s been honest about it. I’m sure he’s good enough to 
mug up”. 
 
SO: Right. So obviously you passed your interview with flying colours! 
 
PS: [Laughs] Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO: But you had a particular view then on Rhodesia’s IDI? 
 
PS: Well, the thing was that I was assigned as a junior legal adviser who was 
responsible for a department in those days. As you probably know, legal 
advice was given to geographical and functional departments, and because of 
the nature of the crisis there were actually two departments devoted wholly to 
Rhodesia; Rhodesia (Economic) which was responsible for enforcing 
sanctions, or not as the case may be, and Rhodesia (Political). It really was a 
fascinating time because a lot of the issues were related to what I call the 
theology of the Illegal Declaration of Independence, which we were careful to 
call it, rather than the UDI as it’s generally known. In our theology it was IDI 
and a lot of the questions related to whether in our terms a particular 
officeholder or a particular action could be regarded as lawful within our 
terms, as opposed to being hopelessly tainted with illegal regime. 
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You’ll remember the Governor: when Smith declared UDI as he called it 
[laughs] the Governor of Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, remained holed out 
in Government House for some years. In fact I did, at the end of the ‘60s after 
I’d left the office, pay my respects and sign the visitors book at Government 
House; it was very strange, and the whole thing was slightly surreal. So, a lot 
of our work consisted, as I say, in deciding what was lawful and what was not 
and whether we could recognise this or recognise that. I remember one 
official from another government department saying to me after a meeting, “I 
suppose you chaps go home and read Alice in Wonderland every night”! 
[Laughs] 
 
I remember once having the distinction of an extract of a letter which I had 
written appearing in a very prominent place in an article in I think The 
Guardian newspaper, because one of the issues we had to deal with was 
whether the United Kingdom government was liable to pay the interest on 
Rhodesian government stock which the Smith regime had repudiated. And I 
remember this: according to the doctrine, the government of Southern 
Rhodesia remains an entity distinct from that of the United Kingdom 
government for legal purposes, even though of course the Secretary of State 
directed the government insofar as it exists as a lawful entity. Not surprisingly, 
we eventually I think lost in the courts. But the other very interesting 
negotiation I was closely involved with was the financing of the building of the 
North Bank of the Kariba Dam. 
 
You may remember that when the Kariba Dam was first built by the 
Federation, it was considered to be a vanity project which would produce 
more power than anybody would ever need. But in fact by about ’68, ’67, ’68, 
if the North Bank Power Station could be built it would give Zambia an 
independent power supply; it would be totally independent from the South 
Bank. 
 
SO: So this is after the emergency coal lift to Zambia by the British and the 
Americans? 
 
PS: That’s right, yes. And it’s very interesting. There’s been a great deal of 
controversy in recent years about the role of legal advisers and the interface 
between law and policy. I remember I drew up this very elaborate 
memorandum which may, for all I know, still be lurking in the archives 
somewhere, explaining that in fact there was no way this could be done 
without imposing additional obligations on the United Kingdom government, 
whereas the United Kingdom government’s position was, ‘yes, well we can do 
this without a further burden on the taxpayer.’ And I always remember the 
then Assistant Under-Secretary of State saying, “Well, I can see what you say 
is entirely accurate from a legal point of view and you’ve done the most 
admirable analysis, but for policy reasons we’re going to go ahead”. I can’t 
remember what the details were, but what I do remember, and this is quite 
interesting, is that I actually sat in the bilateral negotiations with the Zambian 
government, and the Zambian government delegation was led by the 
Secretary for Finance, Ken Knaggs; he was an official who had stayed on 
having been a colonial civil servant. And my goodness me, if anybody 
suggests “Oh well, these chaps were British stooges”, it would be quite 
wrong. He fought in the interests of the Zambian government very effectively. 
So I think that those people who stayed on did naturally play an important 
role. 
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SO: Peter, just from your position as a legal adviser within Rhodesia 
(Political), what was your view of the Commonwealth on Rhodesia? 
 
PS: Well, the interesting thing is that at the time I don’t really remember. I may be 
quite wrong about this but, apart from being a background noise and a 
nuisance, we did not regard the Commonwealth as a very important element 
in the equation at that stage. We certainly didn’t see the Commonwealth as 
an active participant in resolving the situation. We were of course 
embarrassed by criticism particularly from the African Commonwealth, and if 
you remember in Nigeria they actually took assets of British Petroleum. 
 
SO: They did that just before the Lusaka CHOGM in 1979. 
 
PS: Yes, so that was later on. Yes later on, exactly, you’re right, yes. 
 
SO: But at the time, just thinking in the late ‘60s, Tanzania and Ghana 
withdrew their diplomatic representation in London, there was the whole 
furore around the Lagos CHOGM in January of 1966, there was talk of 
the Commonwealth breaking up. You’re talking from the point of view of 
an official that this is really just ‘noises off’. 
 
PS: Yes, at my level certainly. As I think I wrote in one article many years ago, we 
were trying to prove that the pen was mightier than the sword and that 
through legal processes and legal sanctions and denying the legality of 
everything that the illegal regime did, we would  play a real part in eventually 
perhaps bringing the Rhodesia Front government down. 
 
SO: Do you remember any general discussion at the time on the question of 
the British use of force; was that ever anything that percolated through 
to your department? 
 
PS: No, but then I was not privy. 
 
SO: Obviously you weren’t privy to the top level policy discussions, was 
there in any way a generalised debate about whether Britain should 
have used force that you were aware of? 
 
PS: No, I don’t really remember there was. One of the problems, as it turned out 
later of course, was that the oil sanctions were actually being undermined and 
we didn’t know that [laughs] not at my level, at any rate. 
 
SO: No. I was going to say, they knew higher up. 
 
PS: They must have known higher up. 
 
SO: Yes, by ’67, ’68 they were certainly aware. 
 
PS: I think George Thomson, the Secretary of State, was aware. 
 
SO: Yes he was. 
 
PS: But that’s, as I said, that was above my pay grade in those days! [Laughs] 
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SO: That only really hit the fan by the Bingham Report in ’77. 
 
PS: Yes exactly. Yes, that was a very interesting document, the Bingham Report, 
because it was produced at a time when Her Majesty’s Stationery Office was 
on strike. I used to have a copy of it somewhere but it was not easily 
available. 
 
SO: I’ve got a copy of it in that cupboard actually. So, you offered advice to 
the Foreign Office on Rhodesian IDI until 1969? 
 
PS: Yes. 
 
SO: Were you providing any of the legal advice behind the Fearless and 
Tiger talks? 
 
PS: No, that was my boss Henry Steel, who I think I mentioned to you. As far as 
I’m aware he’s still alive; at least I haven’t seen reports of his death, but he 
would be able to tell you all about that because I think he was on - which one 
came first, it was Tiger wasn’t it? 
 
SO: It was Tiger. 
 
PS: I think it was during that period, yes. 
 
SO: 1966 and then Fearless was ’68. 
 
PS: That’s right yes, so maybe it was Fearless. I only remember him commenting 
on the then Chief Justice who was sitting on the fence legally. Sir Hugh 
Beadle, who had been of course appointed lawfully, slipped down the 
companionway and ripped his back: I remember Henry saying, “That’s rather 
a curious thing to happen to a man with no backbone!” [Laughs] 
 
SO: Ouch! 
 
PS: But you remember the background, the rather strange grey area remember 
we were operating in was that the Governor had issued this statement 
immediately after UDI saying, officials, armed forces should carry on with their 
normal tasks. Do you remember? 
 
SO: Ah, yes I do. 
 
PS: So that meant that, so we would make a distinction, again rather a difficult 
distinction, perhaps between acts in furtherance of the rebellion and acts 
which were merely concerned with keeping the country going. 
 
SO: I was going to say, administration and law and order. 
 
PS: Exactly yes, so you can see what I mean about theology, can’t you, the book 
as it were was quite abstruse. [laughs]. 
 
SO: Yes, the contortions that they must have put themselves through. 
 
PS: Yes. 
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SO: How did your professional career develop after that in terms of the 
Commonwealth? 
 
PS: What happened was that I left, I decided rather rashly that I wanted to 
become an academic. I thought this mineral rights business would be an ideal 
thesis, so that’s what I did. I left in order to take up a PhD candidature at 
SOAS where I was supervised by Richard Gray who was a very 
distinguished, sadly no longer with us, historian of Africa. I then took up a 
consultancy with my old firm, with James Lemkin’s firm, and a certain amount 
of work; he acted for the Reverend Michael Scott; we instructed Dingle Foot 
on issues relating to ownership of minerals in what was still then South West 
Africa. This was quite an interesting area of activity. If you remember, The UN 
got round the 1966 decision that the ICJ had no jurisdiction by seeking the 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the consequences for 
states of the Security Council Resolution, relating to the legality of South 
African rule. In fact, this is an aside but that earlier decision, in which they 
went back on the idea that they had standing, did enormous damage to the 
court in the eyes of developing countries, which meant they made no use of 
the Court at all during that period. 
 
SO: Because of that ruling? 
 
PS: Because of that ruling, yes. I think it did have a considerable impact. 
 
SO: You were talking about doing your thesis at SOAS and that you acted as 
a consultant to James Lemkin’s firm. Did you have any formal 
involvement with the Commonwealth then in the 1970s? 
 
PS: No, I don’t think I did really at that stage. It must have developed in the ‘80s 
and ‘90s. In 1977 I got a job as a Lecturer in Law at SOAS and I taught, jointly 
with Professor James Read, the LLM subject in Commonwealth Constitutional 
Law. There were two Commonwealth Constitutional Law LLM options; one 
about what you might call the old Commonwealth and one about the 
developing Commonwealth, so I taught the latter and that led me to a certain 
amount of involvement with current Commonwealth issues - I honestly can’t 
remember when I first really got into the habit of being a regular visitor to the 
Legal Division at the Commonwealth Secretariat but I think it was probably a 
bit later. 
 
Funnily enough, this is an aside, but one of the areas I specialised in in my 
consultancy was immigration law, the development of which was of enormous 
significance. I was actually in the Commonwealth Office, which was still an 
independent office, during the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
in 1968. That was the one which for the first time imposed restrictions on 
British citizens from Commonwealth countries, and eventually the government 
had to back down and say, “Well, actually we can’t exclude”. And I remember 
very vividly, we actually looked up in the famous Oppenheim textbook and 
found this sentence saying, “A state in international law is under an obligation 
not to exclude its own citizens from its territory”. I think perhaps the 
significance of that is, as far as British government circles are concerned, the 
loss of the independent voice of the Commonwealth Relations or 
Commonwealth Office with the Secretary of State in the Cabinet purely 
devoted to Commonwealth issues. 
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SO: So, at that particular point then in your view - you’re talking 1968 – there 
was a demotion of the Commonwealth? 
 
PS: Yes. Well, we were deprived of that because the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs in the Cabinet had been able to present a 
Commonwealth view of the impact of the proposed Bill. So of course once the 
merger had taken place - 
 
SO: There wasn’t a separate voice in Cabinet? 
 
PS: - that independent voice was lost, yes. 
 
SO: Was that a source of concern or indifference in practice that you recall 
among officials? 
 
PS: Well [laughs] the main issue which I remember was it was customary then for 
legal advisers in the Commonwealth Office and in the Foreign Office to meet 
for tea in the afternoon but they met separately and the big question was, 
once the amalgamation had taken place, would we have to tea with the 
Foreign Office people! [Laughs] Sorry, that’s a trivial point but it does illustrate 
that we former CO types had to advise on matters on foreign relations 
generally. I had the exciting task, I remember, of advising on road transport 
agreements with other European countries so that their lorries could come 
across to Dover. So I remember we had relatively cordial relations with 
Romania: we had a treaty with the Romanians - this was in Ceausescu’s time 
- and you had to wheel in a minister to sign the treaty with the Ambassador 
and have a champagne toast. We had a very cordial meeting with the 
Romanians. The following week there was the signing of a similar treaty with 
our French ‘allies’. Lord Chalfont, the minister of state said rather tactlessly, “I 
thought this might be our entry into the Common Market”! Anyway, that’s 
really nothing to do with the Commonwealth is it, but I’m trying to illustrate 
how obviously we became in a sense merged into the general run of foreign 
affairs. 
 
SO: Rather than there being this distinctive administrative, legal, political 
voice of the Commonwealth? 
 
PS: It would be interesting to look at that actually because as I said this was way 
above my pay grade but you may find people who can comment more 
constructively on the impact at the time of the disappearance of the 
independent office. 
 
SO: You talk about the disappearance, but there you are as a Professor 
teaching Commonwealth Constitutional Law at SOAS; did you feel it had 
immediate policy relevance or were you teaching it effectively from a 
historical point of view? 
 
PS: Oh no, what we were looking at were the problems of constitutional 
governments in the developing Commonwealth countries. So a big issue for 
example was the question of the one party state and its implications for 
democratic governance. Obviously we had students from such countries who 
were actively engaged in research on those topics, from countries like 
Zambia, for example. We looked at the contemporary problems of small 
states, which the Commonwealth of course has a large number. 
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SO: Was this a forerunner of political, economic and human rights? 
 
PS: Well the independent Commonwealth countries had all been equipped with 
Bills of Rights. We used to call it ‘the Westminster export model’ because 
really there were some very fundamental differences between the 
Westminster model as practised in Westminster and the model that was 
exported. The fundamental notion of the new Commonwealth countries that 
the constitution is the supreme law and that legislation inconsistent with the 
constitution can be struck down, was then at any rate total anathema to the 
British constitution that was still wedded to the notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty. What was interesting was studying the impact of those 
Commonwealth countries; it was almost a particularly African model which 
adopted this one party state. 
 
SO: To avoid politicised ethnicity? 
 
PS: Well yes, but also of course to avoid in a sense of party politics of any kind. 
Nyerere said, “look, we haven’t got an opposition in this country. So, the only 
way we’re going to get competition for membership of Parliament is to have 
competition to represent the party”. That was the essential idea. So, you did 
have in a sense, particularly in Tanzania, a reasonably democratic order. It’s 
quite interesting, the International Commission of Jurists had a sort of 
seminar in the late ‘70s where Sonny Ramphal, of all people, actually wrote 
an introduction to the published volume saying perhaps the best way that 
democratic accountability can be realised in these countries is through the 
medium of the one party state. 
 
SO: Well, this is very much the era in developmental economics of the state 
as the engine of development? And you had to focus on the politics of 
nation building. 
 
PS: Exactly so, that’s what Kenneth Kaunda believed: the One Zambia, One 
Nation. And we can’t afford the luxury of opposition. We can’t waste talent 
sitting on the opposition benches. 
 
SO: So the political culture of adversarial politics that has evolved in 
Westminster is inappropriate? 
 
PS: Exactly so, but it was based on this idea of the supremacy of the party. If you 
look at the Zambian constitution in 1973, the one party constitution, you’ll see 
it talks about ‘the party and its government’. So, in other words, the party is 
the principal organ of state and the government is the agent of the party in 
carrying out the party’s objectives. 
 
SO: Peter, as a British academic teaching Commonwealth Constitutional 
Law, what was your viewpoint then on one party states in the 
Commonwealth - because that positions the party as the supreme 
authority rather than acting within the structures of the state, and 
responsible and accountable to law? 
 
PS: Exactly yes. Well, it depended of course on restraint and if you look at the 
countries of Eastern Africa that practiced it, Kenya was what we used to call a 
de facto one party state. They never prohibited formally, as far as the 
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constitution was concerned, and the Kenyan constitution remained nominally 
pluralist. But if you look at the ones where the formal changes were made, it 
led to the appalling tyranny of Banda in Malawi, the appalling tyranny of 
Obote and then Amin in Uganda. Things didn’t go terribly well in Sierra Leone 
although it perhaps wasn’t quite as bad. But in Tanzania a relatively benign 
process did permit genuine popular participation. Zambia went into a slow 
decline. When I used to visit Lusaka in the late ‘70s, ‘80s, the last decade of 
Kaunda’s rule, you could see the UNIP fat cats lounging around the pool in 
the Ridgeway Hotel and your taxi driver would say, “What we want to do is 
get rid of the one party state”! [Laughs] So, I think, and you talk about 
development, it became terribly inefficient because Kaunda used to pack 
those great parastatals which ran the mines and pretty well everything else, 
with UNIP cronies - he wasn’t personally corrupt but undoubtedly a number in 
his circle were and they were very glad to have these jobs. 
 
SO: Well, absolutely, the bloated public sector and government pay roll. 
 
PS: Exactly. And also one of the basic principles of the old Westminster system 
was the independence and impartiality of the civil service and that went 
completely by the board. The civil service and even the judiciary to some 
extent. So, I wouldn’t say that there wasn’t a degree of independence. In 
every day judicial work I’m sure there was, but as a Nigerian judge famously 
remarked during the Nigerian military rule, “In times of military rule the judges 
have to speak about human rights with muted trumpets” or a phrase of that 
sort! 
 
[Laughter] 
 
 For example I knew Annel Silungwe, the long, long serving Chief Justice of 
Zambia very well. In fact at one stage he was registered to do a PhD at 
SOAS. He was a close friend of the president, they played golf together. I 
don’t remember him ever entering a judgement which was critical of 
government. 
 
SO: I’ve got two questions coming out of this. One of which is you’ve 
emphasised very much the African Commonwealth, but of course this is 
also in the ‘70s, the era of the Asian Commonwealth and also the 
emerging Pacific Commonwealth.  
 
PS: Well exactly yes, and of course the period of decolonisation in the Pacific is 
really a phenomenon of the 1970s. I’m not sure that the locals were 
desperately keen on independence which meant that they would become as 
they are now, rather isolated, vulnerable states. 
 
SO: Well, the small states have a particular agenda dictated by their small 
population, their vulnerability to climate change - 
 
PS: Exactly so, yes. 
 
SO: - challenge of questions of access to natural sea resources and - 
 
PS: But I always remember my, I think it must have been just after I had left the 
office, I was talking to one of my, still is, close friends, who went on in fact to 
remain throughout his career and ended up as deputy legal adviser, he was 
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drafting the constitution of Fiji and I remember him saying, “Well, actually they 
want to be called the Dominion of Fiji”. And you know they still keep the union 
flag even though they are a Republic! [Laughs] 
 
SO: I do. Fiji had applied to join the empire in 1874 because of repeated 
attacks from Tonga in the first place, so that was a very unusual case. 
 
PS: Yes, but 1970 when they became independent, they wanted to be the 
Dominion of Fiji .The Fijian independence constitution was enormously 
complicated, and some of these constitutions were enormously complicated. 
Going back to my experience of Northern Rhodesia, I think they reckoned the 
1962 constitution in Rhodesia, with its extraordinary complex franchise 
arrangements, was about the most complicated document ever invented! 
 
 Anyway, in the ‘70s really at that stage certainly my awareness of the 
Commonwealth was very much focused on Africa. I did many years later go 
to Tonga on a mission for the Commonwealth Secretariat but that’s another 
story. I remember going to Salisbury as then it was, to do research in the 
National Archives of Rhodesia in furtherance of my PhD research, and again 
the people I was staying with took me on a sort of Rhodes and Founders 
weekend trip to Umtali and then right round the Mozambique border. In fact 
we did actually go over to Mozambique, Portuguese East Africa as then it 
was, right down to the low belt Chiredzi via Fort Victoria, and that was before 
there was any insurrection of any kind. 
 
SO: Those were the ‘glory days’ of the Republic of Rhodesia! 
 
PS: And I remember sitting, because I was still, as I say, working for James 
Lemkin - he used to send me out there on other occasions, and I remember I 
went to Cold Comfort Farm, Guy Cluttenbrock. Under the 1961 constitution 
there was a Constitutional Council which was non-racial and that was still 
meeting before the repudiation of the ’61 constitution, and introduction of the 
1969 constitution which was the full Rhodesian Republic and of course the 
Governor was sitting in Government House. 
 
SO: In glorious isolation. 
 
PS: In glorious isolation. But I remember James saying, “You ought to have a 
weekend off” so I went to spend a weekend in the Victoria Falls Hotel and I 
remember sitting on the veranda there - this must have been after the 
Republic because they were flying the Republican flag, so I suppose this was 
about ’71 - thinking, “How on earth are we ever going to get to a situation 
where that flag comes down”, and it did seem, in 1971 it seemed that that 
would never happen. You remember there were all these talks about talks 
about talks and there was the Pearce Commission and the Test of 
Acceptability that Douglas-Home attempted. 
 
SO: And after all, this was also the era in which white immigration into 
Rhodesia was rising, and as you say successfully sanctions busting, 
seeming peace; the civilian insurrection seemed to have been dealt 
with, although there were occasional, isolated incursions at that 
particular point. 
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PS: They were very isolated, and your point about white immigration is well taken.  
One of the most instructive evenings I’ve spent, I think it was in the public bar, 
the white working class bar of the Victoria Hotel in Bulawayo, and these were 
men who after all in this country would be living in a council house and cycling 
to work, and there they were in a nice bungalow supervising African labour in 
various factories or whether they were in the construction industry, there was 
no way those people were going to, like turkeys, vote for Christmas. 
 
SO: Lower middle and working class aspirational times. 
 
PS: Into the lower middle classes, yes that’s right. 
 
SO: My father used to say Kenya was known as the Officers’ mess and 
Rhodesia as the Sergeants’ mess! 
 
PS: That’s right, the NCOs mess yes. I did notice however that quite a number of 
them slipped off at the end of the evening to meet their coloured mistresses! 
[Laughs]  
 
SO: Yes, but that wouldn’t have been talked about. 
 
PS: No, no. 
 
SO: No. As you say, the hypocrisy of it was embedded within that society.  
By the latter part of the 1970s though, the whole Rhodesia issue is 
becoming increasingly problematic for the Commonwealth because 
growing violence boiling into a civil war. Did you have any particular 
professional involvement or insights in that? In the run up to the Lusaka 
conference in August of 1979. 
 
PS: ’79 yes. 
 
SO: And the constitution of Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe - 
 
PS: No, I didn’t, but I think that’s where the Commonwealth suddenly I think 
(made a difference). British government policymakers could probably throw 
light on that, but Mrs Thatcher who as later was not particularly sympathetic 
to the Commonwealth. Later on over South Africa she was constantly getting 
herself into a minority of one, but I suspect that there was suddenly an 
awareness on the part of the British government that the Commonwealth 
might actually help. And it did; I was very interested from the legal point of 
view in the mechanics of the return to lawful government, which was quite 
fascinating. I did quite a lot, I wrote an article about it which the Secretariat 
published in the Commonwealth Law Bulletin but my role was purely from the 
outside. But the Legal Division was heavily involved and Jeremy Pope played 
a key role in the whole process. 
 
SO: You weren’t acting as an adviser at ComSec in these times? 
 
PS: No, I wasn’t, no, but I was very interested. As I say, I did no more really than 
write an article to explain in considerable tedious detail the whole mechanics 
of the restoration of lawful government. I only mention it because it might be 
forgotten, but I think in some ways it was a unique exercise because it was all 
done. It was a complicated locking mechanism so that the Parliament of 
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Rhodesia, of the Republic, solemnly met and adopted legislation dissolving 
itself and saying, “As from the appointed day Rhodesia shall become the 
Colony of Southern Rhodesia”. 
 
SO: Which reinstated the position of the Governor. 
 
PS: Exactly and Henry Steel, the chap I mentioned had been my boss in the 
Commonwealth Office, in the FCO, was Christopher Soames’s legal adviser 
in the transition period. My first visit after independence I remember was in 
the autumn of 1980; I remember driving with Reg Austin who later became 
Head of the Legal Division of ComSec and was taking over as Head of the 
Law School in the University of Zimbabwe as it is now. We drove from Lusaka 
to Salisbury, as it was still called, through empty roads. I think people hadn’t 
quite got used to the idea that the war was over, the roads were very quiet. I 
remember when I went to Salisbury I interviewed a number of ministers in the 
new government. I went to a big conference: I remember Mugabe was there 
promoting foreign investment and a very able finance minister who’d been a 
UN civil servant. 
 
SO: So, what you’re saying as somebody who was interested in the 
Commonwealth in Africa, that this was the time when the 
Commonwealth really had made a difference? 
 
PS: Yes, well you could say that it had shown the utility of the Lusaka 
Commonwealth Conference in achieving the Lusaka Accord, but also it meant 
that in some ways the whole process was being monitored and overseen by 
the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Through the Commonwealth contribution to the Monitoring Force, to the 
armistice, the Commonwealth Observer Group to monitor elections and 
to report outcomes. 
 
PS: Exactly yes and of course Ramphal himself was an enormously influential 
figure. So I think you could say in a way that the Commonwealth was holding 
Britain to account; but of course this also, to some extent, suited Britain to 
say, well, we’re doing this through the mediation of the Commonwealth. 
Suddenly the Commonwealth now became a positive force as opposed to 
that long period of confrontation where the Commonwealth, as I say, seemed 
a rather tiresome nuisance with African countries playing hell about 
Zimbabwe and the rumours of breaches of oil sanctions. So I think, in many 
ways, I would still think looking back on it that ’79, ’80 was the high point in 
the Commonwealth as an instrument of policy. 
 
SO: But what about South Africa, because a story has emerged on the 
Commonwealth’s contribution to the end of apartheid in South Africa, 
again calling the British government to account, urging Mrs Thatcher in 
the ‘80s to institute sanctions, the creation of the Eminent Persons 
Group of 1986. 
 
PS: Yes, and again it’s a real tragedy that Jeremy Pope has died because he was 
the Head of the Legal Division at the time and he could have thrown 
wonderful light on this whole business from the inside, getting involved with 
the design and execution of the Eminent Persons Group. On the one hand 
you had the Vancouver CHOGM in 1987 where you have these extraordinary 
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communique with the repetition of ‘except for Britain’… So that as far as 
Britain was concerned the Commonwealth was I suppose an isolating factor; 
after all we joined the EEC and I suppose - again this is above my pay grade 
really at the time, but when Britain joined the European Community, well, it’s 
just had its anniversary hasn’t it, we joined on 1st January 1973 - there had 
been to a certain extent the feeling that we were turning our back on the 
Commonwealth. And of course quite elaborate transition arrangements were 
made for the traditional imports from the Commonwealth countries, remember 
the Caribbean sugar and New Zealand butter. So there was a fairly serious 
attempt, but I suppose quite a lot of Conservatives must have thought, well, 
it’s Europe, Europe in a sense is our destiny, rather than their traditional view 
of the value of the Commonwealth link. 
 
SO: But also on this point, how much do you remember discussion or 
observation that here is the Commonwealth calling Britain to account 
for failing to rally round the Commonwealth flag, failing to push 
sanctions on South Africa, to push for universal franchise in South 
Africa and black majority rule, but this criticism is coming from 
Commonwealth countries who themselves were undemocratic, 
practicing one party rule, and, in constitutional and pragmatic terms, 
were ignoring human rights? 
 
PS: Yes, well I think to some extent one has to remember that the modern 
Commonwealth, whatever one thinks in terms of the actual record of 
performance, has been very much an organisation which is committed to the 
promotion of human rights and the rule of law. At least that’s what they keep 
saying all the time! 
 
SO: Particularly since Harare 1991. 
 
PS: Well, it started in Singapore in ’71. So there was the Declaration of 
Commonwealth Principles ironically at the time when Britain was in most 
trouble over supply of arms to South Africa. That was a very interesting 
exercise in the sense that it led the Heath government to publish the full 
opinion of the Law Officers on the basis that we had an obligation under the 
treaties with South Africa to supply them with upgrades for their warships. But 
I don’t remember the Singapore Declaration having a great resonance at the 
time. But then came Harare - and again I think that was very much the kind of 
initiative that was developed from the Secretariat and the Legal Division. 
Ramphal and Jeremy Pope wanted to make the Commonwealth mean 
something. But there wasn’t much in the locker until, as you say really up until 
Harare. 
 
SO: Right.  Peter, by this point you had become involved in the 
Commonwealth Legal Education Association by the early ‘90s? 
 
PS: Yes. 
 
SO: So you had association with the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative, the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association and affiliation with 
the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association by this point? 
 
PS: Yes. 
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SO: I’m just thinking of your own professional involvement in these 
Commonwealth civil society associations and quasi-governmental 
organisations, how much do you think that has also changed the face of 
the Commonwealth through the 90s? 
 
PS: Yes, I think it has and I think the growth of that sort of civil society which in a 
sense one could say it’s one of the things. One of the interesting questions 
which we might talk about is, what do international lawyers make of the 
Commonwealth and its rules and its system? But I think one of the particular 
features of the Commonwealth is the way in which the non-governmental 
societies do play a key role in Commonwealth activities. We can talk about 
Latimer House later on, but that’s obviously a prime example. These 
organisations are of many types: the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 
although the lawyers and I think, the CPA, the Parliamentarians, were original 
sponsors of the organisation, is very much a campaigning organisation; in 
other words it has an agenda and it produces regular reports which it 
introduces at each Heads of Government meeting on issues relating to police 
conduct and reform or gender issues and so on. 
 
There are obviously others, whether they are campaigning on environmental 
issues or whatever, but then there’s this corpus of professional organisations. 
Although, for example, the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association, sometimes 
together with the Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges and the 
Commonwealth Legal Education Association, issues statements on matters of 
public concern. I think our view would be that what we’re trying to do here is 
promote the fundamental values of the Commonwealth. In other words, not 
promoting our own interests, although in part they are associations of 
particular interest groups of lawyers or nurses or journalists or beekeepers or 
whatever. 
 
SO: So taking Harare as your foundational document? 
 
PS: That’s right, yes and in a sense that’s how the Latimer House process began. 
 
SO: So, what do international lawyers make of the Commonwealth, before 
we come onto talking about Latimer House? 
 
PS: Well, it’s quite interesting. For the purposes of writing an article on The 
Commonwealth and the Law, for the Round Table Centenary volume, I did 
actually go through the index of standard textbooks on international law, and 
see what reference they made to the Commonwealth. Now, some make no 
reference at all, some refer even in books published in the 21st century to the 
British Commonwealth [laughs]. 
 
SO: Do they really? 
 
PS: But others do admit that the Commonwealth is clearly an international 
organisation in the sense that it’s an association of states with lawfully defined 
purposes and organs to carry them out, the Heads of Government and the 
Secretariat of course; but unlike most international organisations it doesn’t 
have its own international personality in the way that the United Nations does 
or the European Union does or ASEAN or ECOWAS or NATO. They’re all 
international organisations which have their own legal personality because 
they’re based on a founding treaty; in other words, the member states are 
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bound together in the manner which international lawyers would recognise as 
creating legal obligations to each other on the international plain. One can’t 
say this of the Commonwealth as clearly the Commonwealth doesn’t have the 
treaty. There is no ‘treaty of Commonwealth cooperation’. There could be; the 
Commonwealth is a flexible organisation, but it’s never likely to have that. 
Nevertheless it does have principles to which all members subscribe. 
 
SO: Or ‘aspire’? 
 
PS: Aspire, yes, aspire perhaps. It does have a system of monitoring in the sense 
that the Millbrook Declaration does contain quite a detailed formula if you like, 
to put it that way, as to what happens when a state is in breach or ‘is failing to 
observe’ if one likes to use a slightly more legalistic expression, the principles 
of the Commonwealth. Of course in practice this is usually meant when a 
constitutional government has been overthrown by a coup. So, for example, 
the only member fully suspended at the moment is Fiji which is still under 
military rule. But nevertheless you could say therefore that there is a peer 
review mechanism to oversee the observance of Commonwealth principles; 
and I would say too that international lawyers do not always draw a clear line 
between what is a legal obligation and what is merely an aspiration, as you 
put it, or a principle. One very distinguished French international lawyer said 
that between the darkness and the light there is a twilight zone, so I think 
perhaps Commonwealth obligations for lawyers fall into what is sometimes 
called soft law. Nevertheless I think if you look, going right back to 1977 and 
the Gleneagles Agreement (of course it wasn’t an agreement; it was the 
Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport) it did clearly use quite 
obligatory language. When there was the famous spat between Muldoon and 
Ramphal over a South African rugby tour of New Zealand, the 
Commonwealth finance ministers cancelled their meeting in Auckland. 
[Laughs]. It was hardly an earth shattering sanction but it does imply doesn’t it 
a certain sense of obligation. Now, interestingly enough, and most recently 
one of the things I have been involved with is the crisis over the Chief Justice 
of Sri Lanka. When we issued a statement - that is the CMJA, the CLA, and 
the CLEA issued a joint statement - condemning the process by which they 
were seeking to remove Chief Justice Bandaranaike, (who happens to be an 
old student of mine), it was very noticeable that that stirred up in the 
electronic media responses from persons who were clearly speaking on 
behalf of or sympathetic to the Sri Lankan government saying, “Well, we’re 
not bound by these Latimer House Principles, they’re just a” - 
 
SO: A bit like the pirate code, these are ‘guidelines’? 
 
PS: Yes exactly, yes. In fact Sri Lanka after all, as a full member of the 
Commonwealth, has subscribed to all these principles which Heads of 
Government have always reiterated, but that indicates perhaps the way in 
which this is the twilight zone. 
 
SO: Peter, just to backtrack, you talked of the Millbrook Declaration of 1995 
and you made reference to the Latimer House Principles. Were you 
involved in the diplomacy of the process behind the Latimer House 
Principles in 1998 and their move to formalisation in Abuja? 
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PS: Well, I think it is an interesting story because it illustrates some of the points 
that I have been making. I believe you’ve interviewed Dr Karen Brewer, 
haven’t you? 
 
SO: Yes I have. 
 
PS: Who I’m sure has told you quite a lot about what started as an informal 
committee of representatives of the CLA, the CLEA, the CMJA and the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, who were very important at the 
time because the then Secretary General, Art Donahue of the CPA, was very 
active in promoting the idea that we ought to hold a joint colloquial on the 
relationship between the three branches of government and we had some 
support from the Commonwealth Secretariat. Richard Nzerem and The Legal 
Division were supportive and in fact provided us with some money. I think that 
we got some money possibly from the Commonwealth Foundation as well to 
hold a conference at Latimer House, which is a conference centre in 
Buckinghamshire. And we met and the leading promoters felt that we ought to 
get something concrete out of the meeting. So overnight, we thought, why 
don’t we draw up a series of guidelines? 
 
 Anyway, so on the last morning Art Donahue, the Secretary-General of the 
CPA, and I chaired a session at which we brought the various bits of the 
documents together and adopted essentially the text of the Latimer House 
Guidelines. It was an interesting gathering because it was a gathering of 
academics, parliamentarians including I think the current prime minister of 
one of the Caribbean Commonwealth states, judges and one or two others 
like Derek Ingram and Richard Bourne. So it was a representative gathering I 
suppose of the principal stakeholders. It wasn’t an elective group; it was 
simply people who’d been invited to come to the conference, so we can’t 
pretend it was a representative body in a formal sense, but it did represent 
our organisations certainly. We came up therefore with this text and again I 
think with the assistance of the Secretariat we were able to publish it. I’m sure 
you’ve got a copy of it haven’t you? 
 
SO: Is that the Joint Colloquium publication? 
 
PS: Yes, it’s the Latimer House Guidelines and then we agreed that we would do 
our best to promote them and the Secretariat likewise. I think they found them 
quite helpful. Anyway, the question was what could we do with what a purely 
unofficial document? It had no status other than the fact that it represented, if 
you like, the views of members of these organisations. But then it went before 
law ministers who said, “Well, we couldn’t subscribe to the guidelines as they 
stand” - because they suggested the governments might actually be called to 
account - “but nevertheless we would like to set up a committee of ministers 
who would ‘refine’” was the word used [laughs] “the guidelines”, and we were 
invited to attend as observers. 
 
It was a small committee and so in practice we sat round the table, so I can 
honestly say that the representatives of the CMJA, the CPA and the CLEA 
and the CLA played a constructive and real part in this process whereby the 
guidelines were eventually transmuted into Commonwealth Principles which 
might be adopted, as it were, through what I used to call the red channel. In 
other words, the green channel is the informal channel but this was actually 
going through the red channel of law ministers. And then, I’m not sure that we 
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entirely expected it to happen, but the Abuja Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting was the very difficult one in 2003 when effectively 
Zimbabwe withdrew. I suspect we always understood that the then Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth thought, “Oh well we’ve got to have something 
out of this”, a bit like the Singapore Declaration in ’71. So, Heads of 
Government adopted the Commonwealth Latimer House Principles on the 
relationship between the three branches of government. 
 
SO: So, you’re suggesting that your professional associations were acting 
as establishment figures, giving law ministers support, rather than 
acting as below-the-radar pressure groups? 
 
PS: I think what we were trying to do is to find a way of articulating the 
Commonwealth’s fundamental values in a specific form in terms of those vital 
relationships between governments, parliaments and judiciaries and we did 
work together with ministers. 
 
SO: But at the final point, Peter, what you’re suggesting is that because of 
the disaster of Robert Mugabe withdrawing Zimbabwe from the 
Commonwealth, that there was a sense of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government looking around for something positive to come out of the 
CHOGM? 
 
PS: Well I suspect, I don’t know, I’m sure if you interviewed Don McKinnon, you 
are - 
 
SO: I’m going to, yes. 
 
PS: I’m sure he will throw light on it. So, we had now the Latimer House Principles 
enshrined forever as part of the fundamental values of the Commonwealth as 
was reiterated at the Malta CHOGM two years later. 
 
SO: Had you moved by this point into having quasi-governmental 
representation? Did you have delegate standing at CHOGM meetings by 
this point or not? 
 
PS: No. The only organisation which has a special status at CHOGM really is the 
CPA. We would be an accredited observer, you know, we would have that. 
 
SO: So lawyers are accredited observers? 
 
PS: Yes, whatever the phrase is, we had accreditation for the CHOGM but that 
didn’t really mean very much apart from the fact that we were invited to the 
Secretary General’s reception which the Queen attends at the very beginning 
of the conference; and of course you could I suppose lobby delegates to a 
very limited extent. I think I attended Edinburgh, Durban and Malta. In the 
case of Malta I went as part of the CHRI delegation but I didn’t myself feel 
that there was useful interaction. I don’t think there is to this day, very 
effective interaction between us as the partners and the conference as a 
whole. 
 
SO: So you don’t feel CHOGMs are actually very useful? 
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PS: From our point of view, no. Mind you, of course you can say that they have 
this civil society forum or whatever they call it, the ‘People’s Commonwealth’, 
and that can be quite useful. I went to some of the meetings in Valetta and 
they were quite interesting but in a sense it’s just coinciding with the Heads of 
Government meetings as a gathering of Commonwealth societies. 
 
SO: So you feel that the Commonwealth Law Ministers Meetings are more 
effective? 
 
PS: Well, for us, yes. Again, it’s a little bit difficult because we do sit in to the 
actual sessions of senior officials and law ministers as observers, so we are, 
as it were, present in the room and from time to time we are invited to submit 
papers. 
 
SO: Are you allowed to make oral submissions or are these just written 
submissions? 
 
PS: Well, obviously if one of our representatives is submitting a paper then we do 
have that opportunity and traditionally we’ve had a reporting session where 
each partner organisation has been able to say something about its work and 
invite questions from delegates, but that’s not usually very productive quite 
frankly. (a) we don’t get any questions, and (b) usually it’s squashed in at the 
end, so the actual time available to promote dialogue is rather limited. 
 
If there’s an area where obviously we have a relevant expertise or there is a 
discussion of the role of judges or anything like that, Karen Brewer as the 
General Secretary of CMJA, might be invited purely ad hoc to make a brief 
intervention, but it is fairly limited. One of the problems is that law ministers 
are understandably very wary of having pressure groups having direct access 
to their meetings. Particularly always the delegate from Singapore makes this 
point. There was a proposal which was discussed at the last law ministers for 
civil society to have access to almost half a day when they could raise issues 
with law ministers and that was not at all well received. But then we would like 
to think that we are in a special position because we do have this relationship 
which is typified by the Latimer House process which means that we are 
trying to be partners with the Commonwealth Secretariat in the achievement 
of Commonwealth goals. 
 
SO: In your experience then from three CHOGMs, Edinburgh, Durban and 
Malta, you feel that Heads of Government Meetings are not that useful, 
but Law Ministers Meetings are? 
 
PS: Well, they are because we get much closer obviously to the ministers, we 
have lunch and - 
 
SO: How far are you aware of the internal politics of the Law Ministers 
Meetings? 
 
PS: Well, you can see, they’re rather curious gatherings in some way, they’re not 
quite as exciting as you might think! 
 
SO: [Laughs] 
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PS: All in all, they’re pretty dull actually! - there was an interesting episode which I 
sadly missed where the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association did, by 
invitation, present a paper on gay and lesbian rights and I gather that did 
actually provoke quite a serious division of opinion along the sort of lines that 
you can imagine. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
PS: But that’s a relatively rare occurrence. Singapore is always very concerned to 
make sure that there is no trespassing whatsoever on the sovereignty of 
governments and they have some support, but they invariably take the lead 
on that. That’s why if you look at the final Latimer House Principles document 
it doesn’t contain any effective measures for monitoring the performance of 
member states. On the other hand with the support of the Secretariat, as 
Karen’s probably mentioned to you, we did have a successful meeting in 
Nairobi to develop the Latimer House Principles and if you look at the final 
document, I should have brought a copy of it, sorry, I meant to do that. 
 
SO: Not to worry. 
 
PS: You’ll see where there was a plan of action which we developed in Edinburgh, 
on the wings of the Law Ministers Meeting. 
 
SO: Peter, just though going back to the broader diplomacy of the 
Commonwealth, you made reference to Don McKinnon’s particular role 
at Abuja in 2003. From your standpoint, where was his input in the 
struggle for effective implementation after Abuja; how critical was the 
diplomacy of the Secretary General in actually giving substance to that 
declaration? 
 
PS: Well, I think it was very difficult. I think McKinnon himself was supportive and 
he made the right noises but one has this fundamental limitation that 
Commonwealth governments are not prepared to submit to any effective 
monitoring process other than one that they control themselves. So CMAG is 
a body of foreign ministers; purely it’s a governmental body. If the honourable 
delegate from Singapore, for example, or one of his other likeminded 
colleagues had a whiff of the idea that governments might be submitting 
themselves to some kind of monitoring process by Commonwealth non-
governmental organisations, that was totally unacceptable. So we’re still 
seeking really a way of finding some kind of mechanism by which 
Commonwealth governments can be brought to account for failure to observe 
Commonwealth principles. 
 
Now, if you look at more recent developments - that proposal which emerged 
from the most recent Eminent Persons Group, to have a Commonwealth 
Commissioner for the rule of law in human rights. We did actually try to 
produce quite a detailed proposal, which to try and make it a useful body 
would have avoided using the word ‘Commissioner’ [laughs] – an office which 
could collate information. An information clearing house could at least provide 
some kind of objective assessment of the human rights/rule of law record in 
Commonwealth countries. What we do, as Karen no doubt mentioned to you, 
is submit a confidential report to the Secretary General prior to a CHOGM, 
drawing attention to good and bad practice, as far as the implementation and 
observance of the Latimer House Principles are concerned. So we can do 
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that and the Secretary General can make of it what use he may, but you can 
say that I think the Commissioner proposal is a dead duck. 
 
And then the other proposal of course was a charter from the Commonwealth. 
Now, the original draft of that - I think Michael Kirby, who seems to have put 
his hand to it, would admit as much - was very much a back of the envelope 
job – it was not a tidy document really at all but nevertheless provided the 
basis. We, as the professional organisation, submitted a redraft, which I’m 
sure Karen has mentioned to you. To some extent at least it is reflected in the 
final document that foreign ministers adopted in September and apparently it 
will go forward to the next CHOGM wherever that may be. It’s a charter, 
although it’s not like the UN Charter. The word you used was ‘aspiration’, 
well, it is aspirational. There’s some value perhaps in bringing together in one 
document the values of the Commonwealth which have evolved since 
Singapore, Harare, Auckland, Abuja and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
SO: Peter, what you’re describing here then is a changing role of 
Commonwealth professional organisations trying to assist governments 
so that there could be transparency and accountability on the basis of 
the three pillars supporting democracy. But what you’re also describing 
here is an increasingly introverted, inward looking organisation, with a 
constructive tension between the professional organisations and Heads 
of Government, individual, national governments and parliaments or 
whatever. However, it seems to me that the energy and dynamism of the 
Commonwealth as a diplomatic actor came when its diplomacy and 
policy was focused outside the Commonwealth. 
 
PS: What - as on South Africa? 
 
SO: On the issues of majority rights in Rhodesia and South Africa. Now, is it 
fair to say that the Commonwealth is looking to its internal structures 
more in its diplomacy, rather than outside? 
 
PS: Well, that’s an interesting point. It’s certainly become much more concerned 
in the 21st century with its modus operandi, if I can put it that way. You’ve had 
the emergence of the idea of the Chairman in Office who would be a sort of 
efficient head of the Commonwealth as opposed to the symbolic head and 
then that idea was rather downgraded in the EPG report. And there is much 
talk over the last few years of re-energising and modernising the 
Commonwealth and making it a more efficient organisation to fulfil its 
objectives. I’m trying to think of whether its role on the wider international 
stage has expanded. It has moments, you see, if you remember before the 
Copenhagen summit it produced an environmental declaration. 
 
SO: Yes it did. 
 
PS: Which suddenly seemed to be ‘a real blueprint which would be the trigger for 
effective international action’, but of course Copenhagen didn’t really go down 
that route, did it? 
 
SO: No it didn’t! 
 
PS: It didn’t, but I think I would probably take the view that to regard the 
Commonwealth as an effective instrument of what you might call high 
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diplomacy is going to be very difficult if nothing else because of the wide 
difference of national interests. It’s easier to say what the Commonwealth isn’t 
than what it is. You can say it isn’t NATO, it isn’t the EU, it isn’t the UN. I think 
perhaps one should be less ambitious and see the value of the 
Commonwealth in functional cooperation as a less exciting but very valuable 
role. 
 
SO: So again ‘the nuts and bolts’ of diplomacy rather than the 
grandstanding? 
 
PS: Exactly, that’s right, yes. But in terms of nuts and bolts, remember that over 
half of Commonwealth countries are small states and that a lot of them are 
small island states and in many ways that’s a very lonely place in the modern 
world. For example, there’s that office in the UN which small states that can’t 
afford their own representation can use; it’s funded I think by the Australians. 
It may be that that helps at places like New York and Geneva. The 
Commonwealth can help states to deal with the appalling complexities of the 
world trade system, the WTO. There are actually people in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat who can provide specialist help. 
 
SO: Are you involved in any of those negotiations or consultancies to small 
states in, say, negotiating with multinational organisations? 
 
PS: Not directly, no, I haven’t been actually, but I know the work does go on and it 
is very useful and of much value. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
PS: This comes down of course to the question of the role of the Secretariat. 
There’s a little bit of a worry that it’s a tiny organisation in terms of budget. I 
think it uses the money it gets very effectively but one hears the sinister signs 
of plans, of strategic plans which would rather downgrade the Secretariat to 
being, instead of actually doing things, merely ‘facilitating’. Saying, “Oh well 
we can arrange, we’ll act as a sort of clearing house” rather than actually 
doing the training which the Secretariat traditionally has done. It has 
organised courses for the training of magistrates, looking at the legal field, for 
the training of court officials. That sort of work is much more useful than 
bringing law ministers together for an expensive gathering which I often feel is 
a disproportionate waste of resources these days. 
 
SO: Yes. So, if there’s a macro picture of the Commonwealth and its role to 
the outside world, then it is inaccurate? In fact what you’re saying 
behind the scenes in terms of networks, provision of knowledge, legal 
support, technical support, that that is very much an unsung role in 
providing the glue for the Commonwealth - 
 
PS: Yes that’s right. 
 
SO: - and material support for its members. 
 
PS: Yes.  I think that’s why I think that the Commonwealth tends to have a low 
profile in the old Commonwealth states who obviously don’t - 
 
SO: Don’t need it? 
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PS: Don’t need it, or indeed have to pay for it! One of the things that should 
happen is to reform the budget in the Commonwealth Secretariat to make it - 
 
SO: So that the ABC countries aren’t quite so important? 
 
PS: They have increased their contributions to some extent but countries like 
India and Singapore and Brunei can well afford to make very generous 
contributions [laughs] and so I think people in Canada or in Australia or in the 
UK would say, “Well, so long as the Commonwealth doesn’t trouble us too 
much we don’t mind forking out a bit of cash” but - 
 
SO: Woe betide if it actually becomes an irritant in our side on an issue of 
diplomacy! 
 
PS: Yes, we don’t want the sort of - yes that’s right. 
 
SO: So, the Commonwealth may not now have a public profile of 
contributing significantly to the solution of difficult or intractable 
diplomatic problems that it acquired in the late ‘70s over Rhodesia, over 
the contribution towards transition in South Africa? 
 
PS: Yes, I think that’s right. 
 
SO: But still there is considerable merit in terms of its supporting role in 
unglamorous diplomacy. 
 
PS: Yes that’s right and good offices. For example, in relation to the problems in 
the Maldives there has been - 
 
SO: Have you been personally involved in that? 
 
PS: No I haven’t, no. That is an example of an occasion where if the host state is 
willing the Commonwealth can be of very real assistance, but for example in 
the case of Sri Lanka, the host state isn’t willing. 
 
SO: Also in Sri Lanka there’s the problem that the judiciary is split. 
 
PS: Yes, although the legal profession has been surprisingly united in opposition 
to the government. 
 
SO: Yes, but the fundamental issue is that the host nation has not requested 
Commonwealth assistance. 
 
PS: Well, that’s right, you see, that’s the Commonwealth principle. You can’t go in 
where you’re not asked. Fiji again has been difficult, the regime is not 
welcoming. So, on the other hand if you look at election monitoring, that’s still 
an important role. The recent elections in Sierra Leone and in Ghana are 
good examples of the Commonwealth playing a constructive role. 
 
SO: Yes, I was very struck by the fact that the Commonwealth sent Observer 
Groups in Rhodesia, Zimbabwe 1980, again in Uganda in 1980, and then 
there was a hiatus until the 1990s, when there were 22 Commonwealth 
Observer Groups in the 1990s. 
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PS: Yes exactly and lots more recently. I suppose one could 
say that a test is whether the Commonwealth can repeat the role which it 
played in relation to South Africa in the ‘80s, ‘90s, in Zimbabwe in the 21st 
century, there is a Commonwealth Organisations Committee on Zimbabwe. 
 
SO: Of which you are a member. 
 
PS: Of which I am a member. In fact there’s a meeting tomorrow. And in that, I’m 
ashamed to say, the lawyers have not been as active in that as they might be 
but the medical side has been very active in assisting. 
 
SO: So what are the responsibilities, the particular remit of this committee? 
 
PS: Well, it’s really to promote contacts with Zimbabwe which would assist it in 
fields of education; social services; nursing; law. But it hasn’t got any money 
for a start, but it can act I suppose as a way of keeping lines of 
communication open, and we hope to arrange a meeting with SADC, the High 
Commissioners. I gather there are developments on the new constitution. I 
gather Reg Austin who was Chair of the Human Rights Commission has 
actually resigned because he’s got nothing to work on; he’s got no capacity, 
but I’m not sure. The Secretariat seems to have been and is quite leery, it 
seemed to me, of getting involved with Zimbabwe now in the way that 
Ramphal was very happy to do in relation to South Africa. I often cite this and 
say, when South Africa was outside the Commonwealth it didn’t stop us from 
being actively involved in promoting circumstances where South Africa might 
re-join, which is what happened. 
 
SO: In the case of Rhodesia I was reading just yesterday the documents in 
the Secretariat archives on doing assessments of what were going to be 
the manpower requirements of an independent Zimbabwe and where the 
Commonwealth could assist in training post-independence. It started to 
provide training for railway management. So, as you say, to offer 
thoroughly practical assistance. 
 
PS: Yes. There is rather less of that I’m sorry to say. I’m not sure to what extent 
the opinion in Zimbabwe is being mobilised to feel that the Commonwealth 
might be an organisation it is worth seeking to re-join. Quite frankly, as we 
know, the state of the rule of law and human rights in some existing 
Commonwealth countries is pretty poor in ones like Rwanda. 
 
SO: Peter, what is your view of how the Commonwealth, from your legal 
standpoint, has altered as an organisation with the admission of 
Cameroon, Mozambique, Rwanda – all countries with very different 
linguistic, colonial and legal experiences? 
 
PS: I think it is important to preserve the notion that the Commonwealth is a single 
language organisation. Once you have to go down the road of translation 
…The Rwandan Chief of Justice is coming to London the week after next. 
He’d be somebody interesting for you to ask; what do they make of the 
Commonwealth! [Laughs]. As I understand it, most of the Rwandan elite grew 
up in Uganda so they speak English. Mozambique: they attend the 
Commonwealth meetings like Law Ministers Meetings, senior officials 
meetings, and they obviously send English speaking people, but the idea that 
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we should have civil law countries in the Commonwealth of course is not a 
problem. Indeed a lot of the sort of work that the Legal Division does in 
promoting cooperation in the legal sphere is in areas such as dealing with 
terrorism or rendition of offenders or corrupt practices which apply across 
jurisdictions. They are common problems which countries from all legal 
systems have to tackle. So I don’t think that’s as great a problem. I think there 
is of course this very difficult issue of Commonwealth expansion outside the 
traditional bounds. Where do you stop, in a sense? You could come to the 
point where the Commonwealth is losing its identity. 
 
SO: It’s not the United Nations? 
 
PS: It’s not the United Nations. Obviously there’s quite an interesting list of 
countries which would, under the criteria, subject of course to human rights 
and fundamental values, be eligible. South Sudan is obvious. Burma. 
Palestine. 
 
SO: Algeria is not such a natural candidate. 
 
PS: No, no it isn’t. Nor is Yemen. Curiously enough all the Gulf States which used 
to be protected were always run from the Foreign Office or the India Office 
and were never regarded as part of the Commonwealth. So, there is a 
difficulty about expansion, I don’t think it would be much beyond the sort of 
numbers we’ve got at the moment. 
 
SO: Peter, I’d just like to ask two final questions please. One is on your view 
as a representative of the Commonwealth legal fraternity, on the role of 
the monarchy and Queen Elizabeth. The second is a more general 
concluding question on, how do you feel the Commonwealth has 
survived and why? 
 
So the first: on the role of the monarchy? 
 
PS: Well, I think that’s a very interesting question. As you know, the role of the 
monarchy as Head of the Commonwealth was defined in a very subtle way, in 
the 1949 Declaration relating to the King. The monarch is the symbol of the 
free association and as such, Head of the Commonwealth. In other words, it’s 
intended not to be a functional role. Obviously there are still 14 countries that 
actually acknowledge the Queen as Head of State and it’s interesting that 
they’ve survived for varying reasons. If we look at purely the Headship of the 
Commonwealth, the Queen has clearly made something of it. She still 
addresses the Commonwealth on Christmas Day, she attends 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings with meticulous regularity. 
Obviously she’s been around so long that she’s known them all since they 
were in short trousers really, hasn’t she? So, I think the personal role of the 
Queen is unique. The question is; what should happen on the demise of Her 
Majesty? 
 
When the Queen dies it’s quite clear I think from a legal point of view as far as 
the Headship of the Commonwealth is concerned. I think the question of 
succession of the monarchy is a different matter which, as you know, has 
been regulated now in order to ensure that a female child of Prince William 
and the Duchess of Cambridge will succeed if she is born first. But as far as 
the Headship of the Commonwealth is concerned, this is not a matter where 
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there is automatic succession, so it would have to be a matter for 
consultation. 
 
It’s only happened of course once in 1952 when Nehru immediately 
acknowledged the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth and as India was 
then the only republic in the Commonwealth, that was the end of the matter. 
But it’s a very different case now. So, well, the question is this; first of all, 
does the Commonwealth need a symbolic head? Most international 
organisations don’t have such a symbolic head. You could elect: the Heads of 
Government could choose the host of each CHOGM to be a rotating 
presidency of the Commonwealth, if you’d like to put it that way. As I say, 
Chairman in Office was the phrase used, so you certainly don’t need a 
symbolic head. 
 
So, then the issue is; what are the advantages?  Well I suppose, you could 
have another candidate other than the heir to the throne of the United 
Kingdom and the other realms. How would you choose? The Heads of 
Government would have to do it. It so happens there’s no obvious candidate 
for the role. I’m sure that the Prince of Wales doesn’t want to lose one of his 
mother’s attributes by starting his reign being stripped of the headship of the 
Commonwealth. For all kinds of political reasons the Heads may feel, “Oh, 
let’s just carry on with the British Monarch in that symbolic way”. I’m purely 
postulating the situation when the Queen dies. 
 
 I don’t think there’s any question nor is there any sentiment in favour of 
getting rid of the headship so long as the Queen lives. In fact, quite the 
reverse: unanimity I would think probably in favour of that. But when she dies 
then there is a very serious question. There’s an argument too in a sense that 
it would be symbolic if the British Monarch ceased to be head of the 
Commonwealth. As far as the outside world is concerned, they would say, 
“Right, well, this is clearly an organisation now which no longer has any trails 
of imperial glory lurking round it”. And funnily enough, one of the most useful 
things that could happen to the Commonwealth is if the Republic of Ireland 
were to become a member; although after the Queen’s very successful visit 
clearly the monarchy isn’t the issue it would have been. Just anecdotally from 
Irishmen I’ve talked to, I think they would find it very difficult to join a 
Commonwealth of which the British Monarch was even the symbolic head. I 
may be wrong about that. 
 
SO: So, from your standpoint do you think there’s an enduring perception of 
it being the British Commonwealth? 
 
PS: Well, it’s always difficult to explain. If you explain to non-Commonwealth 
people what you’re talking about, I’ve found myself using the phrase the 
‘former British Commonwealth’ so they won’t think I’m talking about the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
 
SO: States of the former Soviet Union? 
 
PS: Yes. Interestingly enough, I actually went to the Soviet Union. We had a 
rather grand organisation called the Anglo/Soviet Symposium on International 
Law and I went in 1989. We always had to choose a topic to give a paper on 
and I said, “Well, I’ll give a paper on dispute settlement in the 
Commonwealth”. I thought that this was absolutely safe ground because 
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nobody in Moscow, even if they had heard of the Commonwealth, would think 
only of in terms of the British Empire. But surprisingly enough they were very 
interested in the Commonwealth and they even had a research person 
working in the Institute of State and Law on the Commonwealth and they 
said, “Well, what sort of body is this?” they were very interested, as the 
Russians tend to be in categorisation. “What is this animal, the 
Commonwealth?” 
 
SO: You do know in the early 90s the Russians sent a delegation here to 
London to find out about the Commonwealth and its relationship to 
Britain, with a view for considering how could the Commonwealth 
model be used for the former Soviet states? 
 
PS: Yes exactly, and then of course they did have this Commonwealth of 
Independent States. 
 
SO: Indeed. This delegation was interested in the Commonwealth model 
Britain seemed to have developed. They had a seminar with the Director 
and senior research fellows of the ICwS, facilitated by the FCO. 
 
PS: Yes, so it was interesting. But anyway, as far as the monarchy is concerned, I 
think it’s going to be very difficult when the Queen dies. There’s going to be a 
state funeral attended by a very large number of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government or their representatives, so it’s very difficult. But if I was asked to 
give my objective view I would favour the ending of the Headship with her 
present Majesty. 
 
SO: Tied in to the final question, do you think then the role of Queen 
Elizabeth as Head of the Commonwealth has contributed to how the 
Commonwealth has survived, and why? 
 
PS: I think it probably has, yes. There’s no doubt about it that she’s provided, as 
we were talking about, that little bit of glue. It’s that little bit of glue that makes 
the Commonwealth special. We have this remarkable old lady as she is now 
who is Head of the Commonwealth, and remember she’s been tirelessly 
touring the Commonwealth right from the very beginning. It was always the 
Royal tour, wasn’t it, of Commonwealth countries and there was always a 
Royal representative when a country became independent. Prince Charles, 
remember, in Harare in 1979. 
 
SO: In Lusaka she went as Head of the Commonwealth to the Lusaka 
CHOGM meeting and then toured through Zambia as its Queen. But 
what other explanations are there, in your view, for how the 
Commonwealth has survived and why? 
 
PS: Well, there’s always inertia isn’t there! 
 
[Laughter] 
 
And also countries quite like belonging to international organisations which 
seem quite a good club and going to, “Oh, I’m going to the Heads of 
Government Meeting” - 
 
SO: The swank factor? 
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PS:  High Commissioners, you see, have a certain special position as diplomats in 
London and indeed elsewhere. 
 
SO: A certain distinction, that’s true, and there is the High Commissioners 
Network. 
 
PS: “I’m not a foreigner”. 
 
SO: Ah! 
 
PS: The traditional idea of course that the Commonwealth countries were not 
foreign to each other that still survives certainly in English law. 
 
SO: Well, after all you’ve also got the High Commissioners regular meetings 
at other foreign postings which are a remarkably useful network. 
 
PS: Exactly so. 
 
SO: Len Allison makes that point when he couldn’t get into the Zambian 
government in 1979 he used the High Commissioner network. 
 
PS: Yes exactly, and so more positively as I said earlier, it has functional utility. As 
you say, diplomatic networking at that informal level; Commonwealth finance 
ministers always meet before, whatever it is, the finance ministers summit 
and it’s interesting the Commonwealth foreign ministers, I think I’m right in 
saying, resumed the practice of meeting in September in the wings of the new 
session in the UN General Assembly. That’s where they in fact adopted the 
Commonwealth Charter. And all those ways in which small countries feel that 
this is a club they would be glad to belong to because they can look to the 
Secretariat for help and support and perhaps other members of the 
Commonwealth within the region. That’s presumably why Mozambique and 
Rwanda joined the Commonwealth, because they felt this would open up a 
network which wouldn’t otherwise be available to them. One of those crude 
tests of a club is - do you have a list of people who want to be members!  
 
SO: The opposite of Groucho Marx’s maxim! [Laughs] 
 
PS: Yes, exactly so. 
 
SO: But thinking along the lines of practical utility: how far in your 
experience has the Commonwealth also provided diplomatic 
functionality assistance in Commonwealth members’ bilateral relations? 
Helping to resolve legal disputes with neighbouring countries that are 
not part of the Commonwealth? I’m thinking Belize/Guatemala, or 
Guyana’s disputes with Venezuela? 
 
PS: Well, it’s very noticeable of course that Commonwealth Heads of Government 
communiques contain reaffirming statements about Cyprus, Belize or 
Guyana. On Belize, it was a squadron of Harrier jets which Belize, in a sense, 
was most glad of. It is interesting to look at the role of Australia as a regional 
hegemon, or peacemaker and at the deployment of Australian and New 
Zealand aid into the Pacific Commonwealth. Of course there is the fact that 
there are so many Pacific islanders living in Australia and New Zealand! 
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SO: So, actually what you’ve got then within the Commonwealth are regional 
hegemons: within Africa, you’ve got South Africa, Nigeria. You’ve got 
Australia and New Zealand that provide material assistance and 
support. 
 
PS: Support yes. 
 
SO: Not simply in financial terms, or developmental terms but also hard 
power. 
 
PS: Yes there’s a little bit of it, yes. 
 
SO: Although that’s also outside the Commonwealth. It’s both within and 
without. 
 
PS: Yes, but in some ways - 
 
SO: That twilight zone! 
 
PS: It is the twilight zone again, yes exactly. But how would you dissolve the 
Commonwealth? It would be a totally cumbersome business, wouldn’t it! 
We’ve got next Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings already 
being agreed, but I do think that because of the Sri Lanka situation, the 
upcoming CHOGM is a very serious crisis. It only needs a few countries, 
serious countries, to boycott the CHOGM held in Colombo to cause the kind 
of split which existed between Britain and the African Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So old and new Commonwealth could split again? 
 
PS: Yes, and my understanding is that that’s quite a serious issue. It opened up a 
bit with this discussion of a Commonwealth Commissioner and the 
monitoring. Derek Ingram was at Perth; he is somebody who could throw a lot 
of light on that particular issue as whether there is actually a very serious 
2013 Commonwealth crisis. 
 
SO: On that note I’m going to end, but thank you very much indeed. 
 
PS: Thank you very much indeed. 
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
